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Abstract 
This paper assesses the actual implications that the current budgetary supervision legal framework 
(both in the EU Law and Member States) has had on the Economic Constitution. Although there are 
tangible implications for all EU Member States, and the EU as a whole, in this paper I will mainly 
focus in the Euro Area, where budgetary discipline rules have greater consequences. Budgetary 
discipline rules do not automatically entail austerity measures or undermine the powers of Parliaments, 
at least in theory. They have however probably had a crowding-out effect for the construction of a 
(real) economic union, in that measures to construct fiscal capacity and tax integration to discuss 
public spending or to attain a real banking union (to name just a few) have been watered down if not 
abandoned outright.  
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 1 
Introduction1 
The underlying logic of reinforcing budgetary supervision is that closed coordination of this sort is 
necessary in the absence of a real economic (political) and monetary union. In the long term, agreeing 
on a given set of fiscal rules is regarded as a fundamental building block of an economic union. 
The rationale is relatively straightforward: in monetary unions there must be stronger budgetary 
discipline than in the absence of such an union, partly because there may be moral hazard issues, in the 
sense that governments may feel protected by the rest of the union and incur in higher debt than 
otherwise, or be it because member states “fish from the same pool of financial capital”2. 
The idea of introducing budgetary supervision or discipline rules is part of a larger world trend 
however, as a recent IMF report shows
3
. In the European Union, fiscal constraints have been first 
linked to the adoption of the common currency and, since 2010, to the bail-out mechanisms set up in 
the wake of the financial crisis. 
Of course this does not automatically predetermine a given model of budgetary discipline, or even the 
mere existence of written and well detailed fiscal rules, as the comparative examples show (neither 
Canada nor the United States have a centralized system to ensure budgetary discipline). 
In the last five years (2010-2014) there has been, at least formally, a partial transformation in the 
Economic and Monetary Union and, as a result, of the very Economic Constitution in the European 
Union. Most of this transformation has implied building up the Constitution in a disorderly 
progression, seemly without a plan and partly through the back door of financial assistance to some 
EU Member States. An Economic Constitution by instalments. 
The development of the financial and subsequent economic crisis in 2007-2009 and in particular the 
measures adopted (and not adopted) to fight it, have contributed to reinforce a narrative, present since 
the adoption of the first budgetary control rules (the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact), that maintains 
that such rules, which clearly do mirror the German’s idea of stability and frugality (in the form of 
austerity even), undermine powers of Parliaments vis à vis the budget, may curb growth and 
substantially change the economic constitution, endangering the very survival of what is left of the 
European welfare system. In this regard, there is a very powerful and widespread narrative, according 
to which the new economic governance and specifically the “budgetary discipline rules” have 
transformed the European social model, as they are deemed directly responsible for budgetary cuts 
(“austericide” measures), for limiting democratic leeway for Parliaments and overall for helping or 
making more visible the north/south, indebted/debt free, divide. 
This persuasive narrative is not new but is currently more widespread. There is of course truth in this 
general explanation of budgetary rules, but it leaves out the lion’s share of the fundamental problems 
that the stability legal framework presents. By focusing on the harm inflicted by austericide policies, 
this narrative minimizes the arguments for balancing budgets (not necessarily in a centralized manner) 
and may to a certain extent actually misunderstand what the current rules actually entail, by confusing 
their mandatory provisions to the actual policy decisions undertaken “in the name of” such provisions.  
Furthermore, in many instances, austerity has been more a shortcut to avoid harder policy measures 
than a solution imposed upon Member States by the said legal provisions. Austerity may have slowed 
or stopped the implementation of substantial reforms, just as focusing on budgetary limits has crowded 
                                                     
1 Comments are welcome (violetaruizalmendral@gmail.com) 
2 See on the basic models, P. De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union. Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 218 et seq. 
3 Tidiane KINDA, Christina KOLERUS, Priscilla MUTHOORA, and Anke WEBER, IMF Working Paper, “Fiscal Rules at a 
Glance”, October 2013. The report includes four types of rules: budget balance rules, debt rules, expenditure rules, and 
revenue rules. It is accompanied by a electronic database: 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/FiscalRules/map/map.htm 
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2 
out further economic integration in the EU. Overall, budgetary discipline rules should not necessarily 
entail austerity measures or undermine the powers of Parliaments, at least in theory. They have 
however probably had a crowding-out effect for the construction of a (real) economic union, in that 
measures to construct fiscal capacity and tax integration (see the CCCTB project, currently on hold)
4
, 
to discuss public spending or to attain a real banking union (to name just a few) have been watered 
down if not abandoned outright.  
The process is still unfinished and it is thus too early to fully assess its implications. However, even at 
this point it is doubtful that the changes in economic governance, albeit substantial, have actually 
implied a mutation of the Constitution, as some commentators have argued. Somewhat paradoxically, 
the changes may be precluding real fiscal integration. In this regard, my objective in this paper is to 
assess the actual implications that the current legal framework (both in the EU Law and Member 
States) has had on the Economic Constitution. Although there are tangible implications for all EU 
Member States, and the EU as a whole, in this paper I will mainly focus in the Euro Area, where 
budgetary discipline rules have greater consequences.  
The current fiscal consolidation legal framework (insufficient or myopic?) 
The unique experiment of uniting monetary policy without sufficiently coordinating economic policy 
needed a clear warrant that the Union would save its currency whatever it took, and that it was ready 
to introduce hard-bound rules that would force Member States to maintain a certain fiscal balance. 
Investors believed it, as they believed that ultimately the no-bail out clause would not be enforced.  
This link between budgetary rules and the credibility of the currency is biased, and it has evidently 
permeated the Member States’ internal debates; thus for example, the reform of Article 135 of the 
Spanish Constitution or of Austria’s Stability pact of 2012 was fundamentally motivated by a need to 
reassure financial markets
5
.  
The stability legal framework was initially agreed in the Resolution of the European Council on the 
Stability and Growth Pact Amsterdam, (17 June 1997), following among others the European Council 
Madrid meeting of December 1995. The 1997 Stability Pact (Protocol n. 12 on the excessive deficit 
procedure) and the two Council Regulations
6
 gave a very specific shape to the loose principle that 
“Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits” (enshrined in former Art. 104 TEC; current 
Art. 126 TFEU). “Excessive” then became 3 per cent of deficit and 60 per cent of public debt, a strict 
threshold whose rationale has been repeatedly criticized, deemed as arbitrary even. 
The introduction of budgetary stability rules was shaped by the previous (to a certain extent failed) 
attempts to introduce stricter coordination rules in the economic area. The final result cannot be 
understood without paying special attention to the debate previous to the German Constitutional 
                                                     
4 The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) Commission project has been on stand-by since January 2013. 
According to some news sources, the recent “Lux leaks” scandal may spur further movement on the tax harmonization of 
the Corporation Income Tax, probably together with or in the framework of adopting measures to curb “Base erosion and 
profit sharing” (see BEPS project, at the OECD.org, as well as an outline of the Commissions’ initiative thus far:  
http://taxinstitute.ie/TaxPolicyandPractice/RevenuePracticeandRepresentations/EUandInternationalTaxPolicy/EUActionPlan.
aspx 
5 In the case of Austria, the motivation was not to lose the triple “A” rating on its debt. In the case of Spain the situation was 
much more dire with bond yields eventually hitting close to 10 per cent in 2012. 
6 Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97: On the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies (which entered into force 1 July 1998). 
Council Regulation (EC) 1467/97: On speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure 
(which entered into force 1 January 1999. 
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Courts Maastricht Opinion, the Waigel Plan
7
 and, further back, the Werner Plan, an attempt to 
establish the fundamental elements of a monetary union, much more ambitious than the current form 
and that entailed a more fundamental coordination of economic policy
8
. It also had a lot to do with the 
particular institutional architecture of stability price supervision, and the mono-mandate of the 
European Central Bank
9
. 
The current legal framework has been substantially transformed after the crisis, and in direct relation 
to the assistance programmes. Assistance and oversight are two sides of the same coin of budgetary 
governance, in that the former has reinforced the second; they are, as has been pointed out, “joined at 
the hip”10. 
I will leave out the specifics of the assistance programs put in place
11
, as well as the substantial reform 
of the legal framework governing financial institutions
12
. 
As has been repeatedly pointed out, the current framework is a myriad of normative instruments, 
including the relative novelty of an international treaty that actually rests on European Union 
institutions. There are currently two treaties; Treaty on Stability, Cooperation and Governance (TSCG, 
known as the “Fiscal Compact”); the Treaty of the European Stability Mechanism (TESM) with 
specific, and complicated, links to European Law
13
. 
                                                     
7 “Stabilitätspakt für Europa: Finanzpolitik in der dritten Stufe der WWU”. Pressemitteilung des Bundesministerium der 
Finanzen, Bonn, 10 Nov. 1995, at: Deutsche Bundesbank/Auszüge aus Presseartikeln no. 77, 13 Nov. 1995, pp. 6-9. Vid 
the summary at HAHN, H. J: “The Stability Pact for European Monetary Union –Compliance with deficit limit as 
constant legal duty”. Common Market Law Review, n. 35/1998, pp. 80 et seq. BUTI, M.; FRANCO, D.: Fiscal Policy in 
Economic and Monetary Union. Theory, Evidence and Institutions…cit. pp. 19-20. 
8 RUIZ ALMENDRAL, Violeta, Estabilidad presupuestaria y gasto público en España. Madrid, La Ley-Wolters Kluwer 
España, 2008, pp. 33 et seq, Vid. SNYDER, F.: “EMU Revisited: Are We Making a Constitution? What Constitution Are 
We Making?”, at (Eds.: CRAIG, P.; BÙRCA, G. De,): The evolution of EU Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 
pp. 426 et seq.; See also, by F. SNYDER: “EMU –integration and differentiation: metaphor for European Union”, at The 
evolution of EU Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 690 et seq. STRATH, B.: “The Monetary issue and 
European Economic Policy in historical perspective”, at JOERGES, C.; STRATH, B.; WAGNER, P. (Eds.): The 
Economy as a Polity. The Political Constitution of Contemporary Capitalism, UCL Press, 2005, pp. 63 et seq. 
9 ZILIOLI, C.; SELMAYR, M.: “The European Central Bank: An Independent Specialized Organization of Community 
Law”. Common Market Law Review, n. 37/2000, pp. 592 et seq.; TORRENT, R.: “To Whom is the Central Bank the 
Central Bank of: Reaction to Zilioli and Selmayr”, Common Market Law Review, n. 36/1999, 1232 et seq.; 
AMTENBRINK, F.; DE HAAN, J.: “The European Central Bank: An Independent Specialized Organization of 
Community Law –A Comment”, Common Market Law Review, n. 39/2002, pp. 68 et seq.; DUTZLER, B.: “Institutional 
Framework of the EMU –Is the ECB a Fourth Pillar?”, at BREUSS, F.; FINK, G.; GRILLER, S. (Eds.): Institutional, 
Legal and Economic Aspects of EMU. Vienna/Nueva York: Springer, 2003, pp. 5 et seq. 
10 CRAIG, Paul. “Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and Constitutional Implications”. at 
ADAMS, Maurice; FABBRINI, Federico and LAROUCHE, Pierre (Eds.). The Constitutionalization of European Budget 
constraints. Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 23. 
11 On the financial assistance mechanisms: A. DE GREGORIO MERINO, “Legal developments in the economic and 
monetary union during the debt crisis: the mechanisms of Financial Assistance”. Common Market Law Review (2012), p. 
1613, at p. 1615. CRAIG, P. “Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitucional Architecture and Constitutional 
Implications”, at ADAMS, Maurice; FABBRINI, Federico and LAROUCHE, Pierre (Eds.). The Constitutionalization of 
European Budget constraints. Hart Publishing, 2014, pp. 19 et seq. 
12 Specifically on securitization regulatory changes see: RAMOS MUÑOZ, David, Living on the Edge: Securitization 
Supervision and Characterization Problems (October 1, 2009). EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW, 2009, VOLUME 6, 
ISSUE 5. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2397167 
13 See DE WITTE, B.: “Using International Law in the Euro Crisis. Causes and Consequences”. ARENA Working Paper, 
4/June 2013, in particular pp. 22 et seq, on the implications of the system. The author argues, in response to K. Tuori’s 
submission  that the institutional designs of the rescue mechanism are hard to control democratically, that “when the Euro 
area countries wanted to set up a major rescue fund in order to preserve the stability of the euro area (a decision which, 
itself, seems very reasonable), EU law did not provide them with sufficient legal and financial resources, so that “going 
outside” and setting up a separate international organisation was the only available solution” (p. 22).  
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Legal instruments to establish financing (bail-out) mechanisms [the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM)] are thus intertwined with 
the fiscal consolidation legal framework (article 126 of the TFEU, one Directive, and seven 
Regulations - the Six Pack, and Two Pack). 
In 2011, the Stability and Growth Pact, regulated in the 1997 Protocol and two Rulings
14
 was modified 
and enhanced by way of the “Six Pack”, five Regulations and a Directive adopted on November 2011. 
In 2013 two further Regulations were adopted (the “Two Pack”).  
Among other things, the system entails the following: 
First, there has been a substantial rearming of the SGP, at least from a formal perspective, as there are 
more control procedures and more elements under control.  
Specifically, the SGP has been reinforced by Regulation No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies; thus, Regulation 1466/97, as 
updated, establishes the “European Semester”, defined as a “framework” for “economic policy 
coordination”. Regulation 1177/2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and 
clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, also enhances coordination by means 
of including the European Parliament (art 2a), as well as establishing new communication avenues to 
ensure a permanent coordination process (i.e., “permanent dialogue”, article 10a). 
Second, budgetary coordination, with the possibility of (further) sanctions, is set in Regulation 
1173/2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area. 
Regulation 1174/2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in 
the euro further strengthens the prevention phase by way of looking into the whole cycle. The 
Regulation establishes a sanction system specifically for failing to comply with the recommendations, 
or “corrective action recommended by the Council” directed at correcting said imbalances (Art. 5) 
Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 Nov 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the 
Member States establishes the need for independent bodies or bodies endowed with functional 
autonomy that would ensure and monitor compliance country-specific numerical fiscal rules (the debt 
and deficit thresholds among other). The main aim of the Directive is to substantially coordinate 
budgetary frameworks, so that all Member States speak the same (budgetary) language.  
Finally, the Two Pack further harmonizes surveillance of the whole budgetary process, which will be 
substantially more intense should the Member State be either experiencing or threatened with serious 
financial difficulties, as laid out in Regulation 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member 
States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their 
financial stability; for regular situations Regulation 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans 
and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area, establishes a 
common budgetary timeline (Art. 4) and intends, among other things, to prevent Member States from 
(Contd.)                                                                  
The paper can be retrieved at: 
http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2013/wp4-
13.pdf). Accessed 11.1.2015. 
DE WITTE, B.: “The European Treaty Amendment for the Creation of a Financial Stability Mechanism”. Sieps, European 
Policy Analysis (2011: 6epa). 
14 Council Regulations (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies; and 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit 
procedure. 
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adopting their budgets based on “biased and unrealistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts”, 
partially with the help of “Independent bodies monitoring compliance with fiscal rules” (Art. 5). 
The Six Pack, Fiscal Treaty and Two Pack form a set of layers of fiscal surveillance. The system 
works in parallel with direct connections to the bail-out mechanism. As a result, the 1997 Stability and 
Growth Pact is now a full-fledged budgetary and economic policy coordination system that no longer 
merely focuses on the end result of Member States budgets (public debt and deficit figures) but rather 
encompasses the full budgetary cycle as well as (increasingly) the economic policy.  
The basis of the system: numeric deficit and debt thresholds 
Now, as before, general government deficit may not exceed 3 per cent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), while public debt must not exceed 60 per cent of GDP or be in a diminishing path. These 
figures are debatable and have been questioned since the first SGP
15
, in that regard the current 
framework has been improved in that it pays substantially more attention to the overall sustainability 
position of the Member States’ finances by means of the structural deficit. 
The 3 and 60 per cent threshold are still in place but by paying attention to the overall economic cycle 
Member States should try to attain surpluses in good times, and save the deficit for downturns. 
This was introduced in 2005, by reinforcing the so-called preventive arm, by way of setting medium 
term objectives. 
From a purely legal perspective there is certainly room for improvement in some aspects of the design. 
For instance, there is no legal definition of how exactly the notion of “structural deficit” should be 
calculated. In fact the actual method of calculating it is obscure and has not been subject to public 
debate, which will prove problematic, especially if sanctions are imposed. 
Preventing imbalances: fiscal surveillance 
The traditional “preventive arm”, (including the “country-specific medium-term objective) remains in 
place with the following tweaks: 
First, there is now a quantitative definition of what exactly will be considered a “significant deviation” 
of the country-specific medium-term objective (“MTO”).  
Second, this micromanaging of the consolidation path is completed with the existing medium-term 
budgetary frameworks (or “MTBFs”), which is part of the budgetary coordination and basically 
obliges the country to place its budget in a multi-year context. The Commission has been monitoring 
the MTBFs with a set of questionnaires since 2006
16
. 
This complex system entails a way of monitoring the budget that is largely only formal, not 
substantial. Specifically what the MTBFs analyse is the formal framing of budgetary decisions, not the 
decisions themselves. Thus, there is for instance no information on exactly how health spending (to 
name a substantial area of public spending in the EU) is allocated and distributed over time. The focus 
is (again) on the big numbers: budget balance, overall expenditure and its projection on different 
spending areas. 
                                                     
15 Early on see: EICHENGREEN, B.: “Should the Maastricht Treaty be Saved?” (Princeton studies in international finance 
no. 74), Princeton, NJ 1992; by the same author: “Institutions for Fiscal Stability”, 2-3 May, 2003. See also MAJONE, 
G.: Dilemmas of European Integration. The Amiguities & Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005, p. 169; ARTIS, M. J.: “The Stability and Growth Pact: Fiscal Policy in the EMU”, at BREUSS, F.; FINK, 
G.; GRILLER, S. (Eds.): Institutional, Legal and Economic Aspects of EMU. Viena/Nueva York: Springer, 2003, p. 111. 
16 There is currently data available for the years 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012; at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/framework/index_en.htm (accessed 3.1.2015) 
Violeta Ruiz Almendral 
 
6 
However, by forcing Member States to outline specifically how decisions are adopted in the 
construction of the budget and how MTBFs are allocated (what time-frame, etc.), or when they can be 
revised and how, the framework “prods” Member States to both provide information and (maybe) 
reflect on their own budgetary processes and possibly improve accountability. 
See, for example, question 3.10:  
“In terms of the revision of budgetary objectives/targets, please select which of the following applies: 
 The MTBF can be revised at any time 
 The MTBF can be revised once per year 
 The MTBF cannot be revised 
 The government has to publicly justify why the budgetary objectives/targets are revised 
 An independent fiscal institution has to be consulted/has to endorse any revision 
 Other” 
By asking such specific questions the Member State are forced to provide an x-ray of the budgetary 
decision-making process, as well as to the core of the democratic quality of the process; for instance 
question 6.15 addresses media coverage of the Stability/Convergence Programme (SCP) in place, and 
its changes. Other questions refer to the coordination of the different surveillance/benchmark 
mechanisms in place, such as question 6.6.: “How are the fiscal objectives specified in the SCP related 
to the fiscal targets established by the medium-term budgetary framework?” 
Overall, the legal framework is tilted towards prevention, by way of analysing two areas: general 
outcomes (deficit as a percentage of GDP, general spending areas and their percentage equivalences) 
and budgetary procedures. But the control is mostly formal: what the numbers are and what explains 
them, what the plans are and how they are planned (time-framed). There is virtually no coordination 
on basic spending and revenue decisions, which in practice substantially limits the actual impact that 
these Regulations actually have on the role of Member States when designing their budgets, as I argue 
below. 
Fiscal correction 
The “corrective arm”, also known as “excessive deficit procedure”, is reinforced following the 
existing rationale of strict thresholds. The sanctions have never been credible but the current 
framework introduces a new form of sanctions by linking compliance with the financial rescue 
mechanisms. In this regard, there is a whole new system of sanctions building upon and substantially 
expanding the traditional stability pact. Sanctions may be imposed in the prevention phase as well as 
in the correction phase.  
Overall, the correction phase has a wider scope, as the debt criterion is now also taken into account for 
the eventual launching of an EDP. Also, sanctions are at least in theory easier to impose by way of the 
reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV) introduced in the Six Pack for most sanctions. As a 
consequence of the RQMV any recommendation by the Commission will be deemed adopted in the 
Council unless a qualified majority of Member States votes against it. 
Regulation 1173/2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area 
establishes sanctions “for enhancing the enforcement of the preventive and corrective parts of the 
Stability and Growth Pact in the euro area”. Sanctions include not only infractions regarding the 
preventive and corrective phase (arts. 4 to 7), but also manipulation of statistics (Art. 8), done 
“intentionally or by serious negligence” with the result of misrepresenting deficit and debt data. 
The eventual fines and interest paid would accrue to the EU budget and will, in principle, be assigned 
to the to the European Financial Stability Facility, unless Eurozone Member States decide to create 
A Myopic Economic Constitution? Controlling the Debt and the Deficit Without Fiscal Integration 
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“another stability mechanism to provide financial assistance in order to safeguard the stability of the 
euro area as a whole”, in which case said revenue shall be assigned to that mechanism. The 
sanctioning procedure is directed by the Commission (which “shall fully respect the rights of defence 
of the Member State concerned during the investigations”, Art. 8.3, last par.) and is subject to review 
by the European Court of Justice (Art. 8.5). 
A fundamental question still is whether sanctions actually work. It is too early to assess this although 
sanctions have never been imposed in the past. Of course in general sanctions are an attempt to make 
coordination credible, but they are a risky bet, for if sanctions are not credible themselves this 
substantially undermines the logic of the system. Even with reverse majority, sanctions are unlikely to 
be imposed and lack credibility, as has been often pointed out
17
. 
Coordinating budgetary policies 
One distinctive element of the current legal framework is the establishment of so-called “budgetary 
coordination procedure”, in the framework of the “European Semester”, actually established in 2010 
but legally developed in the Six Pack, and substantially reinforced
18
 by the Two Pack, which entered 
into force in May 2013. For countries in a dire situation, the monitoring will be particularly intense, as 
laid out in Regulation 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the 
strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing 
or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability. This specifically means 
that more information will need to be provided, and more recommendations will be received for the 
Member State to implement. In this scenario, the sovereignty of the Member State will be substantially 
limited, at least from a legal perspective. Economically of course, dire situations de facto undermine 
the actual sovereignty of the country, so the comparison terms should be chosen carefully. 
Regulation 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common 
provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive 
deficit of the Member States in the euro area is applicable to all.  
The departing point of budgetary coordination is, of course, that “The Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) requires that Member States regard their economic policies as a matter of 
common concern, that their budgetary policies are guided by the need for sound public finances and 
that their economic policies do not risk jeopardising the proper functioning of economic and monetary 
union” [Whereas (1)]. 
This regulation sets common budgetary rules as a way to harmonize the process. It also deals 
specifically with the problem of unrealistic economic forecasts in the budget
19
. Moreover, the 
Regulation is game changing with regard to the very meaning of “national” budgets. In order to avoid 
spill-over effects Member States must consult “the Commission and each other before adopting any 
                                                     
17 IMF Staff [Céline Allard, Petya Koeva Brooks, John C. Bluedorn, Fabian Bornhorst, Katharine Christopherson, Franziska 
Ohnsorge, Tigran Poghosyan, and an IMF Staff Team] discussion note “Toward a Fiscal Union for the Euro Area”, p 11 
(available on their site). 
18According to the explanatory in the Commission website: 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/convergence/index_en.htm, accessed 16.12.2014) 
19 Council Regulation (EU) No. 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common 
provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the 
Member States in the euro area, para. 10: “Biased and unrealistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts can 
considerably hamper the effectiveness of budgetary planning and, consequently, impair commitment to budgetary 
discipline. Unbiased and realistic macroeconomic forecasts can be provided by independent bodies or bodies endowed 
with functional autonomy vis-à-vis the budgetary authorities of a Member State and which are underpinned by national 
legal provisions ensuring a high degree of functional autonomy and accountability. Such forecasts should be used 
throughout the budgetary procedure”. 
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major fiscal policy reform plans with potential spill-over effects”, allowing assessment of the possible 
impact that such a reform may have. 
The Regulation does not provide examples but the general terms in which it is explained practically 
allows for any major policy change to need to be consulted. It establishes, because budgetary plans are 
to be “of common concern”, that they must be submitted to the Commission “for monitoring 
purposes” before they are sent to Parliament, following the procedure set out in article 7. This 
submission may have consequences, for should the Commission identify “particularly serious non-
compliance with the budgetary policy obligations laid down in the SGP”, it will request a revised draft 
of the budgetary plan, in particular “where the implementation of the draft budgetary plan would put at 
risk the financial stability of the Member State concerned or risk jeopardising the proper functioning 
of the economic and monetary union, or where the implementation of the draft budgetary plan would 
entail an obvious significant violation of the recommendations adopted by the Council under the 
SGP”. The Commission’s opinion on the plan must be adopted in November at the latest. The National 
Parliament is then given an opportunity to request that the Commission presents its opinion directly in 
the Chamber, once such opinion has been made public (Art. 7.3).  
In this regard, the game change is primarily directed to the Executive power. It can be argued that, in a 
way, the Regulation may actually strengthen the role of National Parliament, at least not in 
comparison with their ideal role but with the actual role in the context of complicated documents that 
are difficult to fully discuss.  
Finally, the partnership programme outlined in article 9 is designed to help bring forward “structural 
reforms necessary to ensure an effective and durable correction of the EDP”. Should the Member State 
be part of an EDP the reporting requirements will be of much greater scope (Art. 10), which basically 
consists of substantially enhanced reporting obligations, outlining all the different elements of the 
budget. 
The current legal framework has been self-evaluated in the Commission reports of February and 
November 2014. The evaluation does not provide much information on the actual functioning of the 
system, which is consistent with the fact that it is quite new. 
The Commission’s own assessment is mildly optimistic despite the fact that most of the Regulation 
has so far not been applied:  
 “The Commission is of the opinion that Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 has so far proven an 
adequate framework for a strengthened monitoring and surveillance of the euro-area Member 
States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial 
stability”20.  
 “However, as explained in this Communication, the short timeframe during which this 
Regulation has been in force provides limited evidence on which to base this evaluation. 
Enhanced surveillance, for example, remains to be tested, but the Regulation establishes a 
framework which should enable closer monitoring of euro-area Member States either threatened 
with, or experiencing, financial difficulties. Post-programme surveillance also remains to be 
tested.”21 
It is too soon to determine the real effect that the Two Pack has had on how national budgets are 
designed. However, given the actual regulation, the impact is, again, mostly formal. The Two Pack 
addresses how the information, the budgetary decisions, has to be reflected on the budget.  
                                                     
20 European Commission. “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013”. COM (2014) 61 final, 6.2.2014, p. 7. 
21 European Commission. “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013”. COM(2014) 61 final, 6.2.2014, p. 7. 
A Myopic Economic Constitution? Controlling the Debt and the Deficit Without Fiscal Integration 
9 
The budgetary stability legal framework does not directly refer to public spending but rather to the 
final macro-result of the budget (deficit or surplus)
 22
. And yet it has been on public spending that the 
(public) debate has been mostly focused. This is not new as it is quite common to confuse public 
spending with budgetary procedures and techniques. Simply put, the current legal framework has all to 
do with the second, and virtually nothing with the former. 
How budgets are approved, controlled and how the public purse is allocated has been the major focus 
of the stability framework and most of the public debate. But budgetary stability, at least in the long 
run, cannot be achieved by adopting such a myopic view. The revenue side (taxes and other public 
resources), as well as the fundamental elements of public spending cannot be a mere side-effect of 
fiscal restraints but the departing point. 
In a nutshell: what the legal framework entails (and what it does not) 
The original sin, or structural design failure, of the 1997 legal framework was that fiscal rules were 
established without real economic coordination. The failure of the current system is the logic-defying 
link established between budgetary constraints or fiscal rules, bail-out mechanisms and the sovereign 
debt market situation.  
The need for some form of budgetary discipline (with this model or another) in a monetary union may 
seem self-evident, at least in theory. But so is the fact that looseness of fiscal policy did not cause the 
sovereign debt crisis
23
. 
Furthermore, the very design of the monetary union, and in practice the process by which member 
states have lost their stabilizers, namely, the Central Bank’s roles as lender of last resort, has very 
likely aggravated the crisis, with a solvency crisis which was followed by austerity policies that in turn 
further worsened the situation
24
. To exclude this element from the equation makes the whole 
construction dangerously myopic. 
In this regard, democratic deficit has been often named as the main structural problem with the current 
supervision/prevention legal framework
25
. However, the system is not that different from the existing 
one, at least in its logic, which can be argued that it was faulty before and it is now. The general idea is 
that Member States are still free to design their budgetary processes, and fundamentally, to tax and to 
spend, but they do need to convey structured detailed information on the process. 
In a way, the current system is more flexible, or realistic. Rather than examining rote compliance with 
the 3-60 thresholds, the new legal system intends to control the process, including the possible danger 
zones (prevention phases). This is a formalization of the existing loose Commission recommendations, 
                                                     
22 HERDEGEN, M. J.: “Price Stability and Budgetary Restraints in the Economic and Monetary Union: The Law as 
Guardian of Economic Wisdom”. Common Market Law Review, vol. 35, n. 1/1998, pp. 9 et seq. 
23 See a critic at Paul DE GRAUWE, Yuemei JI, “How much fiscal discipline in a monetary union?”. Special Conference 
paper, May 23-24, 2013 (available here: 
www.bankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis/SCP201321.pdf). The author makes an exception for Greece. 
24 Paul DE GRAUWE explains how “we found out that financial markets acquire great power in a monetary union: they can 
force countries into a bad equilibrium characterized by increasing interest rates that trigger excessive austerity measures, 
which in turn lead to a deflationary spiral that aggravates the fiscal crisis. Countries pushed into such a bad equilibrium 
now face long periods of economic recession that will test the political and social acceptability of a monetary system that 
had been presented as heaven but is now perceived to be a hell for millions of people”. DE GRAUWE, Paul, “Design 
Failures in the Eurozone - can they be fixed?”, European Commission, Economic Papers 491 | April 2013, p. 9. 
25 Paul De Grauwe has harshly critized the Two Pack and spoken of “the danger of a new governance of the budgetary 
process that decides top down on budgetary manners without clearly defining the political responsibilities for these 
decisions”. DE GRAUWE, P.: “Design Failures in the Eurozone - can they be fixed?”, European Commission, Economic 
Papers 491, April 2013, p. 25. 
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which will now adopt different forms (macroeconomic imbalances reports, different shades of early 
warning system). 
The process (or rather, the cycle) is encapsulated in the so-called European Semester, in which 
Member States’ budgetary cycles become European budgetary cycles by means of permanent 
connection with the EU institutions: 
 
Budgetary cycle 
Phase Participating institutions 
0. Pre-budgeting National Governments / Commission 
1. Elaboration (law project) National Governments / supervision by Independent 
Councils 
2. Approval National Parliaments 
3. Execution (Spending phase) National Governments 
4. Control National Government  (internal control mechanisms) 
National Parliaments (Fiscal Councils) 
Commission/Council (end results). 
European Court of Justice 
5. Controlling the results Deficit/debt: 
- Commission/Council 
- ECJ 
According to an oft repeated rant against the legal framework, it would undermine the principle of “no 
taxation without representation”, or rather; misalign the decision to tax and to spend, in the sense that 
the Commission may eventually force spending cuts or the raising of taxes without bearing its political 
costs
26
. This is however only true in the bail-out procedures, which at the same time do leave some 
leeway for adjustment.  
                                                     
26 “However, the moves towards political unification should not come at the cost of a loss of democratic legitimacy. I have 
argued that this is the case with the recent introduction of the “two-pack” legislation. The latter transfers considerable 
power to the Commission without this power being checked by political control. The European Commission, which now 
obtains de facto power to force national governments to impose additional taxes or to cut spending, escapes the political 
accountability for these decisions. Such a model of integration should be rejected now. If not, it will lead to great 
conflicts in the future and a slow but steady further erosion of the willingness of the European populations to move 
forward into a political union.” DE GRAUWE, Paul, “Design Failures in the Eurozone - can they be fixed?, op.cit. pp. 
29-30. 
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This general outline of the current legal framework does pose different legal issues
27
.  
First, there is no legal definition on how structural deficit is to be defined. This is problematic as the 
numerical value of such deficit has direct and clear consequences, which can ultimately entail the 
imposition of sanctions, possibly without sufficient legal certainty
28
.  
Second, there is also some doubt as to what the “contracts” or Memorandum of Understanding signed 
by Member States recipients of financial assistance actually are. The contracts are envisaged in art. 13 
of the ESM and are formally a possibility under the Lisbon Treaty, but some of the recommendations 
nonetheless pose doubts as to their legal anchorage. 
Finally, there is much to be said about the legal technique employed, consisting of approving a set of 
different Regulations (a total of seven) with cross referencing among them which, even excluding their 
complicated relation with the Fiscal Treaty and the Directive, makes it very difficult to have a general 
idea of what the current legal framework entails and what the general principles are. Without 
principles, a theological and systematic interpretation of their provision is made harder. 
The need for fiscal “discipline”, “surveillance” or the adoption of “automatic” measures and correction 
paths derives from the legal framework in a very obvious way. The patched-up legal system builds on 
the previous legal framework in that it established specific debt and deficit ratio thresholds, as well as 
an institutional design to control compliance levels. But the enhanced permanent supervision adds 
significant complexity to the budgetary cycle. It also gives the impression of an automatic process, of 
complicated machinery where every step of building the budget is (formally) monitored. 
This sense of control is misleading. There is only external control, albeit substantially centralized
29
. 
But the content of the budget is left unsupervised, except for the general recommendations provided 
by the Commission (bailed out/non-bailed out countries). This by itself may create perverse 
incentives: the feeling of control fosters moral hazard. Because the budget cycle is being monitored 
externally, there may seem no need to internally monitor it, for instance by substantially revising the 
expenditure/revenue structure of the country. As long as a Member State is complying, or in the 
process of complying with the external framework, there will be less pressure to fully revise its 
spending structure, which is problematic in particular in the European Union.
30
 
From a purely psychological perspective the abuse of terms that convey a sense of control reveals the 
intrinsic difficulty of actually coordinating Member States budgetary policies. 
Another question of course is whether budgets in the EU can actually be harmonized. The short 
answer is no, so that budgetary coordination cannot be anything more than large-numbers coordination 
or general frameworks coordination (time-frames, and such), but without real internal coordination. 
This is of course reasonable as that type of coordination would not be feasible even in a more 
integrated Union, which would in any event be some form of Federation, which means Member States 
would keep at least the budgetary powers currently held by federal States. In the words of Paul De 
Grauwe “the euro is a currency without a country. To make the euro sustainable a country will have to 
                                                     
27 See CRAIG, Paul. “Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and Constitutional 
Implications”, p. 26. 
28 The method has been recently amended; see G. MOURRE, G. ISBASOIU, D. PATERNOSTER and M. SALTO: “The 
cyclically-adjusted budget balance used in the EU fiscal framework: an update”. Economic Papers 478 | March 2013. 
29 FABBRINI, F.: “The Fiscal Compact, the ‘Golden Rule’ and the Paradox of European Federalism.” Boston College 
International & Comparative Law Review 36 (2013). 
30 In particular due to the looming demografic crisis the cost of Health care and Public pensions would need to be subtantially 
overhauled (see a summary at: http://www.economist.com/node/3243014; see also the 2013 Annual Growth Survey and 
the Commissions recommendations). 
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be created”31. Ultimately, the fundamental design failure remains the same as in the first set of fiscal 
rules: the impossibility of enforcing budgetary coordination in the absence of political integration. The 
system is also inefficiently centralized, as C. WYPLOSZ has very rightly pointed out
32
. 
In hindsight, it can be argued again, and indeed often has, that leapfrogging to a fully-fledged 
coordination of the budgetary frameworks was too fast, reckless even. The current “hybrid governance 
model”33 was not part of the plan. Until 1985 Europe was a dual political entity, with integration 
mostly limited to the construction of the common market, and ordoliberal rationalism that coexisted 
with decisions on public spending left entirely to Member States
34
. The Delors White Paper on 
Completion of the Internal Market
35
 is a tipping point that will be reflected in the Maastricht treaty and 
consolidated, at least in part, through the monetary union
36
. Of course the Maastricht Treaty only 
partly followed the Delors proposal, which also entailed a political union
37
. The step towards monetary 
union was taken without fulfilling the necessary economic coordination prerequisites. Thus, the 
current and, to a certain extent, unforeseen design of the EMU is a unique experiment, which separates 
economic and monetary union contra natura, as has also been often been pointed out
38
.  
The laxity of the economic policy coordination criteria is offset by strict debt/deficit rules that end up 
substantially restricting the leeway of Member States in the face of an economic crisis, a limitation 
that may end up contributing to further non-compliance situations, as has also been often pointed out. 
This is all the more dangerous inasmuch as there is an obvious loophole as there is an institution in 
control of monetary policy (ECB) but no corresponding institution in economic policy.  
The dysfunctions of the previous and the current fiscal framework are only a consequence of that, and 
they become worse because the rules are predetermined for all, drone-like one-size-fits-all rules, so to 
speak, that in some cases may end up substituting policy initiatives
39
. More worryingly, the legal 
framework is seemingly easy to comply with in the very short term by means of budgetary cuts that 
will then increase the public debt in the mid-term, as has already happened.  
 
                                                     
31 DE GRAUWE, Paul, “Design Failures in the Eurozone - can they be fixed?”, European Commission, Economic Papers 
491, April 2013, p. 25. 
32 WYPLOSZ, C. “Europe’s Quest for Fiscal Discipline”, Economic Papers 498, April 2013, p. 31. 
33 MAHER, I.: “Economic governance: hybridity, accountability and control”. Columbia Journal of European Law, vol. 
13/2007, p. 682. See a critic at: HATZOPOULOS, V.: “Why the Open Method of Coordination Is Bad for You: a Letter 
to the EU”. European Law Journal, vol. 13, n. 3/2007, pp. 322-323. 
34 See JOERGES, C.: “The Market without a State? The “Economic Constitution” of the European Community and the 
Rebirth of Regulatory Politics”. European Integration Online Papers (EioP), Vol. 1, n. 019/1997. 
35 Commission of the EC, “Commission White Paper to the European Council on Completion of the Internal Market”, 
COM(85) 310 final of 14 June 1985. 
36 JOERGES, C.: “What is Left of the European Economic Constitution? A Melancholic Eulogy…cit. pp. 16 et seq. Vid 
SNYDER, F.: “EMU Revisited: Are We Making a Constitution? What Constitution Are We Making?”, at (Eds.: CRAIG, 
P.; BÙRCA, G. De,): The evolution of EU Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 433 et seq. 
37 On the different proposals see: SNYDER, F.: “EMU Revisited: Are We Making a Constitution? What Constitution Are We 
Making?”, op.cit. pp. 421 et seq. 
38 MAHER, I.: “Economic governance: hybridity, accountability and control”. Columbia Journal of European Law, vol. 
13/2007, p. 682. HATZOPOULOS, V.: “Why the Open Method of Coordination Is Bad for You: a Letter to the EU”. 
European Law Journal, vol. 13, n. 3/2007, pp. 322-323. SNYDER, F.: “EMU Revisited: Are We Making a Constitution? 
What Constitution Are We Making?”, at: AA.VV. (Eds.: CRAIG, P.; BÙRCA, G. De,): The evolution of EU Law. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 434 et seq. 
39 JOERGES, C.: “What is Left of the European Economic Constitution? A Melancholic Eulogy…cit. pp. 14 et seq. 
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The introduction of fiscal constraints in Eurozone Member States’ legal frameworks: appropriation 
of rules in substance or only in form? 
This time is different for budgetary rules as well. This time, Member States are expected to 
appropriate the rules. In particular, Eurozone member states must implement budgetary constraints by 
means of establishing rules of “binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional” 
(Fiscal Compact). The idea is for Member States to have “skin in the game”, and to acquire a stability 
culture and control it through its legal system. 
At this point, only three years after the Fiscal Compact made it mandatory for Member States to 
establish their own budgetary discipline provisions, the only analysis that can be undertaken on 
national rules is purely descriptive. There is substantial information on which countries have adopted 
which rule, on what timeframe and with what after what type of public debate. There is also 
information (in the press) on what type of public debate, if any, has surrounded the adoption of the 
rules. Tellingly, the public debates seem similar; in the bailed-out countries, formal or informal 
budgetary rules were a pre-condition for help to be received. Overall, the debate focused mainly on 
austerity measures necessary to meet the deficit and debt thresholds.  
But there is a further restriction for a full assessment of the constitutional or legal internal rules, which 
is their own legal set of concepts. A mere transplant of a debt brake into a legal system with no 
procedures or even tradition of assessing the budget will be nothing more than a rare exotic plant that 
may or may not take root in the legal environment to which it is transplanted. It quite evidently 
follows that the actual consequences of the constitutional reforms will depend on the existing culture
40
, 
as migration of constitutional concepts does occur, but it is questionable whether forcing such 
migration in a centralized manner attains the same result. 
This of course defeats the very rationale behind urging Member States to adopt constitutional or 
otherwise binding rules: that they internalize the stability rules. The idea is that Member States 
internalize the stability “culture”. The desired effect being that such rules will no longer be regarded as 
outside rules. 
For that purpose, Member States do not need to change their constitutional rules, but do have to 
substantially change their system by introducing hard-to-reform rules (such as organic laws, whose 
approval requires an absolute majority). So far, however, four members of the Eurozone have 
modified their Constitutions: Italy, Spain, Slovakia, Germany and Slovenia
41
. In the case of Germany 
and Spain (which partially follows the German reform
42
), the reforms took place before the Fiscal 
Compact required them to. Spain was then one of the early adopters, for well-known specific reasons, 
which is the substantial increase of the bond yields in the summer of 2011 (which actually paled in 
comparison with 2012 skyrocketing bond yields, after the reform). On September 27
th
 2011 Article 
135 of the Constitution was amended for the purpose of introducing deficit and debt rules.  
                                                     
40 15 October 2014; the first report of the newly minted Autoridad Independiente de Responsabilidad Fiscal exposes the 
consequences of not having a credible fiscal stability culture; the presented budgets, analyzed by this institution, are 
incomplete and difficult to assess (see p. 15 et seq. of the “Informe sobre los Proyectos y Líneas Fundamentales de los 
Presupuestos de las Administraciones Públicas”, available only in Spanish, here: 
http://www.airef.es/es/contenidos/informes/66-informe-sobre-los-presupuestos-de-las-administraciones-publicas 
41 See: FABBRINI, F.: “The Fiscal Compact, the ‘Golden Rule’ and the Paradox of European Federalism”, 2012, (SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2096227); later published at Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 36 
(2013). CUENCA, Alain; RUIZ ALMENDRAL, V. “Budgetary stability in the autonomous regions: Beyond 
constitutional reform”. Spanish Economic and Financial Outlook, vol. 3, n. 4 (July 2014). 
42 See CORDERO GONZÁLEZ, E.: “La reforma de la constitución financiera alemana en particular, el nuevo límite al 
endeudamiento de la federación y los Länder” [The reform of the financial Constitution in Germany], Teoría y Realidad 
Constitucional, n. 29, 2012, p. 289 at pp. 325-326. 
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The provision is further developed in Organic Law 2/2012 (Law on Budgetary Stability and Financial 
Sustainability)
43
. 
After that, the first European Member States to adopt such a constitutional provision was Poland, 
which limited public debt to 60 per cent, inserting an early warning requirement to adopt special 
actions when the limit hit 60 per cent. Hungary adopted a similar system, granting special supervisory 
powers to its Constitutional Court. 
For some EU Member States, the Six Pack/Two Pack legal framework has substantially altered the 
budgetary legal framework. For others, it has promoted a reform or further sophistication of an 
existing system. For some EU Member States, there already was a culture of controlling budgetary 
stability, be it by having already some form of debt and the deficit rule in the Constitution or because 
their legal system provided for it.  
Austria
44
 has a balanced budget rule (based on the German model), which was adopted in 2011. It has 
established a new budgetary framework, including the fixed spending limits for specific programmes 
or the adoption of the “output orientation” of the administration. The existing internal stability pact 
directly deals with the distribution of the burden (debt and deficit limits, between the centre and the 
subnational entities, which will entail a modification of the territorial financial system 
(Finanzausgleichsgesetz). This internal pact was not legally binding but in practice forced Länder to 
comply with it or be punished by losing part of the revenue from shared taxes. The Austrian 
Constitutional Court ruled on the constitutionality of the TSCG on October 3, 2013. Belgium already 
had a constitutional provision for regions, while Cyprus, on the other hand, had neither fiscal rules, 
binding medium-term budgetary framework (MTBF), or any type of fiscal council. Estonia has 
adopted a new budget law, as of 2014. France has also adopted its own rule. Germany has an extensive 
experience with fiscal constraints, having introduced a form of legal rule in 1967
45
. Currently the 
German rule is embedded in article 109
46
, and as is well known, it has served as a blueprint for the 
Fiscal Compact. Germany’s regions (Länder) are not allowed to run a deficit after 2020. One salient 
element of Germany’s model is the creation, directly in the Constitution, of a Stability Council. Italy 
modified, through Constitutional Law 1/2012, articles 81, 97, 117 and 119. Article 119 specifically 
provides a no bail out for the regions. The 1/2012 Law also creates a Fiscal Council. In Italy the 
harmonization of public budgets is now an exclusive competence of the centre (Article 117). Portugal 
enacted an organic law (Budgetary Framework Law)  
What have these reforms achieved?  
General deficit has improved while debt has substantially increased, as it is normal after a recession. 
But causality should not be mistaken with correlation. The situation may or may not have been 
improved because of the adjustment paths adopted (i.e., austerity measures) and budgetary discipline 
rules. 
                                                     
43 See RUIZ ALMENDRAL, V., The Spanish Legal Framework for Curbing the Public Debt and the Deficit (January 1, 
2014). European Constitutional Law Review, 9: 189–204, 2013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2412010. 
See a comparison of the ‘golden rule’ in different EU Constitutions at: F. Fabbrini, ‘The Fiscal Compact, the ‘Golden 
Rule’ and the Paradox of European Federalism’, (SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2096227). 
44 I follow the report by Daniela Jaros (eurocrisislaw.eui.eu/austria). 
45 Gesetz zur Förderung der Stabilität und des Wachstums der Wirtschaft, June 1967, codified then in Art. 115 of the German 
Constitution. 
46 See Federal Ministry of Finance, Economics Department: “Reforming the constitutional Budget rules in Germany”. 
September 2009    
(at: 
http://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=http%
3A%2F%2Fwww.kas.de%2Fwf%2Fdoc%2Fkas_21127-1522-4-
30.pdf%3F101116013053&ei=7DcRVYiNN8PTUfuzgtAO&usg=AFQjCNF0hGQUWfON6AL5EZN85jx09ZGbWA&si
g2=nyY-Y2JPCcbYpq0xECENhA&bvm=bv.89184060,d.d24, accessed: 23. March 2015). 
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There are currently a total of eleven countries with on-going excessive deficit procedures, of which 
eight are Eurozone members: 
 
Overview of ongoing excessive deficit procedures
47
 
Country Date of the Commission 
report  
(Art.104.3/126.3) 
Council Decision on existence 
of excessive deficit 
(Art.104.6/126.6) 
Current 
deadline for 
correction 
Malta 21 May 2013 21 June 2013 2014 
Cyprus  12 May 2010 13 July 2010 2016 
Portugal 7 October 2009 2 December 2009 2015 
Slovenia 7 October 2009 2 December 2009 2015 
France  18 February 2009 27 April 2009 2015 
Ireland  18 February 2009 27 April 2009 2015 
Greece  18 February 2009 27 April 2009 2016 
Spain  18 February 2009 27 April 2009 2016 
As for complying with structural balance rule, it is harder to determine causality as there are no 
historical numbers. 
 
Structural balance of general government: 
Adjustment based on potential GDP Excessive deficit procedure
48
 
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Austria -2.9520 -2.4845 -1.8423 -1.2706 -1.1082 -0.9997 
Belgium -3.7085 -3.6419 -3.1232 -2.6918 -2.6345 -2.2410 
Cyprus -5.2408 -5.7004 -5.4915 -2.1247 -0.8434 -1.3259 
                                                     
47 Accessed 23.3.2015: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/corrective_arm/index_en.htm 
48 Unit: Percentage of potential GDP at current prices. Source: AMECO database. 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/Include/Query.cfm?serie=UBLGAPS&trn=1&agg=0&unite=319&ref=0&noms
erie=Structural+balance+of+general+government+%3A-
+Adjustment+based+on+potential+GDP+Excessive+deficit+procedure (accessed 9.1.2015). 
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Structural balance of general government: 
Adjustment based on potential GDP Excessive deficit procedure
48
 
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Estonia 0.2861 -0.2396 -0.3736 -1.1395 -0.7755 -0.6899 
Finland -1.0681 -0.7950 -1.0537 -0.7280 -1.0986 -1.1049 
France -5.8488 -5.0014 -4.2732 -3.2815 -3.0293 -2.9268 
Germany -2.0712 -1.2735 0.0384 0.5936 0.7122 0.6078 
Greece -9.4646 -5.6974 0.0517 3.1418 2.0182 1.6300 
Ireland -8.7719 -8.0105 -7.0844 -4.7644 -3.7702 -3.3343 
Italy -3.2499 -3.3045 -1.6409 -0.8026 -0.9012 -0.8052 
Latvia -2.2457 -1.0722 -0.0534 -1.0295 -1.4737 -1.6443 
Lithuania -3.3885 -3.7723 -2.8222 -2.1957 -1.7598 -1.5608 
Luxembourg 0.1809 0.7903 1.5429 2.0241 1.1075 0.4009 
Malta -4.3075 -3.0837 -3.8402 -2.7080 -2.7495 -2.9216 
Netherlands -3.7930 -3.8002 -2.2340 -0.5951 -0.5403 -0.8062 
Portugal -7.5120 -5.4465 -2.3100 -1.9409 -1.3495 -1.6693 
Slovakia -7.2884 -4.0532 -3.3929 -1.3643 -2.1020 -1.2810 
Slovenia -4.5597 -4.4539 -1.8164 -1.8102 -2.5084 -2.1898 
Spain -7.0214 -6.2631 -3.6156 -2.3293 -2.1644 -2.3400 
Euro area (18 
countries)
49
 
-4.2477 -3.5547 -2.1116 -1.1898 -1.0928 -1.0990 
European Union 
(28 countries) 
-4.6133 -3.7849 -2.7211 -1.6887 -1.7949 -1.7569 
These numbers are hard to link effectively to the legal reforms, and they hide what by far is should be 
a major concern, which is debt sustainability. This should open a different scenario, looming long 
                                                     
49 This database does not include Lithuania yet (a Eurozone member since 1 January 2015). 
A Myopic Economic Constitution? Controlling the Debt and the Deficit Without Fiscal Integration 
17 
since 2010 and which possibly will have to be dealt with sooner or later: the possibility of orderly debt 
restructuring, or partial controlled default. 
No public debate or legal provision regarding insolvency 
The possibility of sovereign insolvency in the Eurozone has been largely ignored both by investors 
and the legal system
50
. To date, no system to deal with the insolvency of a Member State has been put 
in place, except for the limited-scope approach adopted through the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), which is in a way a contractual solution.  
There are however different options to tackle possible insolvencies, which can be largely divided into 
two groups: the statutory (public law) systems, and the contractual systems
51
. In this regard, there have 
been different proposals to adopt a long-term solvency procedure that are worth assessing. 
One of them, put forward by C. G. PAULUS and I. TIRADO
52
, includes the setting up of a special 
court-like institution (such as the Sovereign Debt Tribunal proposed by the IMF) and partly mimics 
the US Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11 proceeding. The proposal departs from and builds on the existing 
ESM, which would need to be reformulated. 
The recent “PADRE” and “PADRE 2.0” proposals by Pierre PÂRIS and Charles WYPLOSZ propose 
not a debt restructuring but a debt rescheduling scheme, which ends up implying a reduction via 
rollover. PADRE is based on the purchase of public bonds on the secondary market by the ECB. 
PADRE 2.0 is a similar scheme without involving the ECB
53
. The proposals start by clearly outlining 
exactly how unsustainable public debts currently are; a Member State with a debt nearing 95 per cent 
(like Spain) would need to grow at an annual rate of 3.5 % for thirty five years for its debt to fit the 60 
per cent threshold it if intends to apply the Commission’s rule of reducing debt by 0.5 per cent of GDP 
annually. The opportunity costs of such a debt reduction programme would be huge and may also 
substantially reduce the possibility of dealing with other shocks, as of yet unforeseen.   
All proposals tackle the moral hazard problem by tying the debt restructuring or rescheduling 
(respectively) to imposing actual enforceable fiscal discipline. 
The rationale for dealing with the debt is clear: “bringing indebtedness down is unlikely to be achieved 
through growth because high debts stunt growth.
 
Debt restructuring can be the magic bullet that erases 
the legacy and opens the space needed to bring austerity policies to an end”54. At the same time, some 
authors have pointed out the impossibility of continuing with the current system of debtor/creditor, 
north/south, rich/poor (take your pick) divide. Recently, Jürgen Habermas
55
:  
                                                     
50 And not for lack of examples, as C. G. PAULUS and I. TIRADO show; see “Sweet and lowdown: a resolvency process 
and the Eurozone’s crisis management framework”, pp. 3 et seq; at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2330423. 
51 See ROGOFF/ZETTELMEYER, “Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976-2001”, IMF Staff 
Papers 49, n. 3, 2002; PAULUS, C. G.; TIRADO, I.: “Sweet and lowdown: a resolvency process and the Eurozone’s 
crisis management framework, pp. 4 et seq. 
52 PAULUS, C. G.; TIRADO, I.: “Sweet and lowdown: a resolvency process and the Eurozone’s crisis management 
framework, op.cit. pp. 8 et seq. 
53 See P. PÂRIS; C. WYPLOSZ: “PADRE: Politically Acceptable Debt Resolution in the Eurozone”, Geneva Report on the 
World Economy, Special No3, CEPR, London, 2014; and : “PADRE 2.0:Politically Acceptable Debt Restructuring in the 
Eurozone”, May 2014  
(available at: 
http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/international_economics/shared/international_economics/prof_w
ebsites/wyplosz/Papers/PADRE%202.pdf/.; accessed 24.3.2015) 
54 WYPLOSZ, C.: “Europe’s Quest for Fiscal Discipline”, Economic Papers 498, April 2013, p. 41. 
55 “Democracy, Solidarity and the European Crisis”, Lecture delivered by Professor Jürgen HABERMAS on 26 April 2013 in 
Leuven. 
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“This time, the uncontrolled systemic contingencies of a form of capitalism driven by unrestrained 
financial markets are transformed into tensions between the member states of the European Monetary 
Union. If one wants to preserve the Monetary Union, it is no longer enough, given the structural 
imbalances between the national economies, to provide loans to over-indebted states so that each 
should improve its competitiveness by its own efforts. What is required is solidarity instead, a 
cooperative effort from a shared political perspective to promote growth and competitiveness in the 
euro zone as a whole. Such an effort would require Germany and several other countries to accept 
short- and medium-term negative redistribution effects in its own longer-term self-interest — a classic 
example of solidarity, at least on the conceptual analysis I have presented”. 
The above critics support the proposals for common Eurobonds, and more recently, debt restructuring 
(such as the PADRE proposal). In this scenario, not studying debt restructuring or rescheduling 
options may actually be the more reckless option. But it should come hand in hand with analyzing the 
structure of public spending (what to finance and how) and the revenue system (taxations systems and 
compliance levels). There are different estimations on the level of tax fraud and evasion in Spain, 
which can be place at around 7.5 per cent of GDP (11.6 in the case of Italy and 4.86 in the case of the 
UK)
56
. 
Democracy: Parliaments and the budget; distribution of authority in multinational States 
The actual role of Parliaments in the budget 
Budgets have a double nature; they are, so to speak a “hybrid” document, legal form and political 
action.  
The double nature of the budget is clearly seen in its life cycle, which traditionally (before EU 
coordination) went like this: 
 Phase 1: Elaboration. Budgets are elaborated by the Executive power, the Government, which 
normally will have the sole legislative initiative in this matter. 
 Phase 2: Approval. Budgets are discussed and eventually approved by Parliament.  
 Phase 3: Execution. Budgets are a document designed for the Executive, who must then apply it 
(i.e., spend the monies). 
 Phase 4: Control. Budgets, or rather their execution, will be ex post facto controlled by 
Parliament, through a Court of Auditors. There are other forms of control, such as internal 
Government base control mechanisms as well as by specific budgetary offices. 
This double nature has many implications: 
First and foremost, the way budgets are structured, approved and executed depends directly from the 
political structure of the country as well as, directly, from the specific procedure to approve laws. 
Some countries do not have a written Constitution, while others have the whole budgetary process 
perfectly outlined in the Constitution (such as Article 134 of the Spanish Constitution, or, more 
impressively as to its detail, Articles 110 et seq. of the German Constitution). Other countries, such as 
                                                     
56 There is no official data for Spain. The numbers above can be found here: The Guardian ("Tax evasion: how much does it 
cost?") http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/sep/27/tax-evasion-how-much-does-it-cost-a-country Accessed 
on 24.3.2015 
The actual tax fraud is difficult to assess, as well as the size of the informal economy. 
See in this regard: Schneider, F.: “The Shadow Economy and Work in the Shadow: What Do We (Not) Know?”, March 2012 
(IZA DP No. 6423), Which estimates a size of 19.3 for the Spanish Shadow Economy (25.1 for Greece, and 22.3 for 
Italy) –at http://ftp.iza.org/dp6423.pdf. (accessed 24.3.2015) 
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the USA, do not even have “a budget”, but many different laws covering aspects of the budget57. This 
by itself translates into Parliaments having wildly different powers in the budgetary process to start 
with.  
Budgets are also and fundamentally political action in numbers, in that they mirror the Executives’ 
plan. For this reason, and despite country differences, budgets are by and large a product of 
Governments, not a product of Parliaments. A Government outlines and directs economic policy 
mainly through the budget.  
One of the consequences of this double nature of budgets is quite tangible: failing to have the budget 
approved is one way of losing confidence in Parliament. In most countries, Governments remain the 
masters of Budgets, not Parliaments.  
The current EU budgetary coordination legal framework has a myriad of implications
58
, but it does not 
substantially change the way Parliaments deal with the budget. The consequences will more directly 
be felt by the Executive power. 
The general idea that Parliaments get to allocate and control the public money is one of the oldest 
principles in democracy, rooted in the separation of powers. It has however acquired a substantial 
amount of complexity overtime. It was during Rationalism that the Budget rules or “principles” were 
set. These principles shaped the Budget as both a fundamental political document and an Act of 
Parliament. One of these principles was the notion of equilibrium. Thus, the idea of balancing the 
Budget, i.e., controlling the resulting debt and deficit during the budget cycle and establishing some 
predetermined rules to be legally binding is far from new.  
It was not until the mid XX century that budgets acquired its present form, that of lengthy complicated 
documents summarizing all public economic policy. The game change, and subsequent increase of 
public spending that took place mainly after the Second World War (New Deal, Welfare State) 
transformed public budgets into documents both difficult to manage and to discuss in a public forum 
such as the Parliament. The chambers still approved the document, but they were growingly incapable 
of fully discussing its complicated content. To a certain extent, there is a trade-off between the size of 
the public sector, and the possibility that the budget that encapsulates its financing can be 
democratically discussed. In fact, the very size of the budget fostered a certain re-allocation of 
spending decisions. Thus, to ease the management of public funds, new techniques such as the 
creation of independent agencies resulted into chunks of public funds being decided and controls 
completely outside the Parliament, whose role was limited to approving their overall budget. 
Because budget laws were no longer democratically debated laws, but executive documents that flew 
through Parliament, and precisely in order to partially minimize the democratic deficit some areas 
were excluded of budget laws, such as those not directly related to the estimation of revenues and the 
authorization of expenditures. This was embedded in some constitutions or became part of the rules 
governing the budget. Article 134
59
 of the Spanish Constitution limits the possible content of the 
budget to “the entire expenditure and income of the State public sector and a specific mention shall be 
made of the amount of the fiscal benefits affecting State taxes” (Art. 134.2) and specifically precludes 
the budget from creating taxes (“The Budget Act may not establish new taxes. It may modify them, 
                                                     
57 See OECD. The Legal Framework for Budget Systems. An International Comparison. OECD Journal on Budgeting, Vol. 
4-No. 3. Special Issue, 2004, pp. 28-30. 
58 See P. CRAIG “Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitucional Architecture and Constitutional Implications”, 
in particular pp. 26 et seq. 
59 See article 34.19 of the French Constitutions (and Art. 1 of the Loi organique relative aux lois de finances). This has also 
been the subject of much conflict in France; see DÉCHAUX, Raphaël “L´évolution de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle 
en matière de “cavaliers” entre 1996 et 2006”; at: http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/pdf/Conseil/cavaliers.pdf, accessed 24.3.2015. 
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whenever a tax law of a substantive nature so provides”; Art. 134.760). The objective to avoid extra 
budgetary matters, also known as “cavaliers budgétaires” is usually linked to maintaining the rule of 
law and the democratic principle; because budgets are complicated documents discussed in Parliament 
during a very limited time including other non-directly related matters contributes to the discussion 
losing its focus and therefore undermines the role of Parliament of controlling the Budget. 
These limits to the possible content of the Budget have been the source of numerous conflicts before 
the Spanish Constitutional Court, with a large amount of Budget laws being challenged for containing 
provisions not directly linked to the Budget
61
. Of course taking into account that the Budget is like an 
x-ray of public action, it is very difficult to establish the red line separating Budget matters and 
material regulation. Ultimately most political decisions can be linked to an expenditure decision. How 
weak that link is will determine if that provision is constitutional. 
So, in fact, when analysing the democratic impact of the current EU legal framework, it should be 
borne in mind that Parliaments in practice have a very limited role in the budget. The crisis of 
Parliaments vis-à-vis the Budget has existed long before the “golden rules”. Among other elements, 
growing public spending made it very hard to actually control the budget (both its approval and the 
after-life). Furthermore, the role of Parliaments is severely limited due to other circumstances, for 
instance the possibility to alter the effective impact of the budget or parts of it by way of Royal 
Decrees
62
. 
This does not minimize the democratic deficit that the current EU legal framework entails, as argued 
by many commentators
63
. But the deficit lies fundamentally in the imposition of general measures in a 
one-size-fit-all mode, and is of a structural nature. There is no longer such thing as a “national” budget 
in a monetary union. 
On the other hand, it could be argued in fact that the MTBF do pose a real opportunity to enhance the 
participation of Parliaments in the budget
64
, as does the MTO. Both soft governance instruments 
actually require Member States to outline their policy measures and place them in the economic 
context. This in itself is not new; it is part of the Parliament’s role when assessing the budget. But 
really shows that the actual power of Parliament is diminished as it is virtually impossible to fully 
assess such a complex document. From that perspective, MTBFs may actually provide a very useful 
“navigation tool” for Parliaments. 
In fact, one of the dimensions assessed in the MTBFs database is the actual involvement of the 
national parliament in the preparation of the medium term budgetary plans
65
. 
For the fiscal year 2012, the assessment showed the following results: 
In most cases (16 out of 28), there was no vote (score 1). Finally, in 3 cases there was no formal 
presentation of the objectives to the national parliament. In 9 cases, there was a vote of the parliament 
on the main medium-term objectives (in the context of a national MTBF or of the Stability and 
Convergence Programmes (SCP) (score 2). 
                                                     
60 Spanish Constitution, official translation. 
61 There are many examples. Recent cases include SSTC 9/2013, 28 January, FJ 2; 86/2013,  11 April, FJ 2, or 206/2013, 5 
December. Every year there are at least three cases where the question is posed. 
62 In Spain there were 29 Royal Decrees in 2012, 17 in 2013 and so far in 2014, 12. 
63 CLOSA MONTERO, Carlos, “La Gobernanza Fiscal y Macroeconómica Europea y Sus Limitaciones Democráticas” 
Revista Aranzadi Unión Europea XXXVIII, 12/2012, pp. 51–65. 
64 One of the elements surveyed for the MTBF database is in fact 
(Database –in an excel document- can be found here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/framework/index_en.htm) 
65 See Database, Box 2 “Scores...”, Dimension 2. 
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Country Involvement of National Parliaments in the preparation of MTBF 
Austria No vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
Belgium No vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
Bulgaria No formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
Cyprus No vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
Czech 
Republic 
Vote of the parliament on the main medium-term objectives (in the context 
of a national MTBF or of the SCP) 
Germany No vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
Denmark 
Vote of the parliament on the main medium-term objectives (in the context 
of a national MTBF or of the SCP) 
Estonia No vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
Greece No vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
Spain 
Vote of the parliament on the main medium-term objectives (in the context 
of a national MTBF or of the SCP) 
Finland No vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
France 
Vote of the parliament on the main medium-term objectives (in the context 
of a national MTBF or of the SCP) 
Croatia 
Vote of the parliament on the main medium-term objectives (in the context 
of a national MTBF or of the SCP) 
Hungary No vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
Ireland No formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
Italy No vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
Lithuania No vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
Luxembourg No vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
Latvia No vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
Malta No vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
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Country Involvement of National Parliaments in the preparation of MTBF 
Netherlands 
Vote of the parliament on the main medium-term objectives (in the context 
of a national MTBF or of the SCP) 
Poland No formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
Portugal 
Vote of the parliament on the main medium-term objectives (in the context 
of a national MTBF or of the SCP) 
Romania 
Vote of the parliament on the main medium-term objectives (in the context 
of a national MTBF or of the SCP) 
Sweden No vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
Slovenia No vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
Slovakia No vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament 
United 
Kingdom 
Vote of the parliament on the main medium-term objectives (in the context 
of a national MTBF or of the SCP) 
Fiscal constraints in multinational (Federal) states 
A different issue that is directly linked to the democratic deficit discussion is whether and to what 
extent the current legal regime may shape the internal distribution of powers. 
The Union is far from blind to the internal distribution of powers between the centre and subnational 
entities in the Member States
66
.From a territorial perspective, the internal stability pact mirrors the 
German model
67
, and has thus entailed a substantial amount of centralization. There has been a 
substantial revision of decentralization, as the Austrian, Italian, Portuguese
68
 and Spanish cases 
show
69
. 
From a purely theoretical perspective, establishing some form of fiscal constraints or budgetary 
discipline rules for subnational governments will be needed, especially if the market-pressure 
mechanisms (i.e., more expensive financing as a mechanism to borrow less) do not work. One of the 
situations where they may not work is when there is a reasonable expectation that the centre will bail 
                                                     
66 The Spanish Constitutional Court has repeatedly stated that EU Law is blind and does not directly affect distribution of 
authority. In fact the opposite can be concluded by examining the case law See also, in this WP series, the paper by  N. 
Skoutaris (“State-region dimensions of Euro-crisis law”), the Euro-crisis law evidently has direct impact on the balance 
of powers between the centre and the regions.. 
67 See in this series, Nikos SKOUTARIS, “State-region dimensions of Euro-crisis law” (2015) Constitutional Change 
Through Euro Crisis Law Workshop, European University Institute, 17-18 October 2014 (forthcoming). 
68 See the report by the Conselho das Finanças Públicas (Portuguese Public Finance Council) 1/2013, titled “Analysis of the 
Legal Proposals for New Subnational Finance Laws”, pp. 20 et seq. 
69 See N. Skoutaris “State-region dimensions of Euro-crisis law”, Constitutional Change Through Euro Crisis Law 
Workshop, European University Institute, 17-18 October 2014 (forthcoming). 
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out Communities. From this perspective, merely stating, in a law or agreement, that there will be no 
bail outs does not suffice, there needs to be a history of no bailouts
70
. 
Internal fiscal rules may be procedural (analysing and benchmarking budgets) and numerical (debt and 
deficit limits, spending caps). An obvious difficulty with simple numerical rules is that they can be 
bypassed through accounting tricks or by cutting spending in an inefficient manner (i.e., investing 
less)
71
. 
Ideally, internal fiscal rules should allow for cyclical flexibility, but because it is difficult to accurately 
determine local cycles, a rainy day fund may be more effective. 
In any event, fiscal rules will not foster fiscal discipline in the absence of real political commitment, or 
when the system of intergovernmental relations or of subnational financing is inefficient. 
Spain’s internal pact is a good example of all the inefficiencies described. Although it was 
implemented in 2001, it has not been able to avoid fiscal gimmickry schemes; for example, the 
building of a now empty airport in Ciudad Real which was “privately” financed, that is, paid for by 
Savings banks (Cajas de Ahorros) with obvious links to the Community’s Government (Castilla-La 
Mancha). At the same time, there have been substantial, across the board budget cuts in the provision 
of Health and Education services, which amount to about 70 per cent of Communities’ budget. The 
system has been substantially centralized, as Communities do not have much say in the way budgetary 
rules are applied to them. The system of intergovernmental relations envisaged in the LOFCA and 
institutionalized in the “Consejo Fiscal de Política Fiscal y Financiera” (CPFF) is in practice a way to 
convey Autonomous Communities decisions made by the centre. The CPFF has a very limited role in 
the internal fiscal pact which, according to some, is in breach of Article 135 of the Constitution, which 
clearly called for a larger role for the CPFF or any other similar institution. Strikingly, Cataluña has 
not challenged it
72
. Finally, the system is in itself not credible. There have been successive bail outs 
and there are bound to be more
73
. The financing system itself is hardly transparent and there coexists 
both a “common” system and the foral regimes, whose arrangements are also obscure and probably 
count as a privilege in the actual implementation formula
74
. 
The current EU legal system says little about internal powers. It is naturally (formally) left to Member 
States. The very design of the system is, however, hardly compatible with a decentralized system, 
which is partly why the evidence shows progressive centralization (as the Italian, Spanish or 
Portuguese cases show), following the German model, which is highly centralized for a decentralized 
state, taking into account the legal framework to force Länder to comply with the debt and deficit 
                                                     
70 TER-MINASSIAN, T.: “Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments: Can They Promote Fiscal Discipline?”. OECD 
Journal on Budgeting, Volume 6 – No. 3, 2007, p. 4. 
71 TER-MINASSIAN, T.: “Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments: Can They Promote Fiscal Discipline?”. OECD 
Journal on Budgeting, Volume 6 – No. 3, 2007, pp. 6 et seq. 
72 One possible explanation is that Cataluña approved its own Stability law which may not comply with the Constitution, as 
some definitions divert from the States’ organic law, which operates as an umbrella of concepts that must be followed by 
Communities. The Centre and this Community met under the bilateral conflict-resolution commission, an ad-hoc organ 
designed to avoid bringing conflicts before the Constitutional Court and, most likely, both parties decided not to 
challenge each other’s laws. Another explanation is that Cataluña is one of the main recipients of the Liquidity Fund. 
73 CUENCA, A.; RUIZ ALMENDRAL, V., “Budgetary stability in the autonomous regions: Beyond constitutional reform”. 
Spanish Economic and Financial Outlook, vol. 3, n. 4 (July 2014); See a critic and proposals for a real transparent 
subnational debt restructuring at: TIRADO, I.: “At the core of the sovereign crisis in Spain: restructuring subnational debt 
versus internal bailout”. Capital Markets Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 76 et seq. 
74 See in this regard: ZABALZA, A.; and LÓPEZ-LABORDA, J.: “The Uneasy Coexistence of the Spanish Foral and 
Common Regional Finance Systems”. Wp-ec 2014-02, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, 2014, p. 31. 
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brakes. The “Germanization of the governance of the euro”75 has other consequences, as pointed out, 
but the impact on fiscal federalism is currently being felt, but it is probably too soon (again) to fully 
assess the impact
76
. 
Constitutional fiscal constraints and public spending 
The case for fiscal constraints 
The economic wisdom behind the need to balance the budget in the mid and long-term is well known 
and the basic idea is largely uncontested, namely, that high public debt levels do curb growth
77
 and 
eventually endanger sustainability; hence the rationale for hard-bound rules. 
The establishment of legally binding fiscal rules, loosely defined as rules that impose a constraint on 
fiscal policy (by controlling debt and/or public deficit) is a relatively new phenomenon. According to 
the IMF database
78
, in 1985-86, only Austria, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and the 
United States had some form of Fiscal Rules. In 2013, only a few countries do not have one 
(Argentina, Canada, Iceland, India, and Maldives). 
In the current EU context in particular, the establishment of such rules must be understood in the 
context of an older and larger debate, namely, and roughly, the debate on public spending as a motor 
(or “multiplier”, as Keynes put it) of growth, versus monetary policy. The (relative) crisis of 
Keynesian policies contributed to the sophisticated analysis of the consequences of a public deficit.  
It is a structural element of democracies, to a certain extent at least, that when public deficits 
consolidate they may indeed burden growth, as well as establish a sort of ghost tax upon future 
generations. Budgeting methods as well as lobby groups facilitate the resilience to change public 
spending (once budgeted, it will never move)
79
. Budgetary allocations reflect the power of the organs 
in charge of their management. In many instances, it will be hard to avoid political incentives to 
increase public spending and finance it with debt operations, rather than with new taxes
80
, thus giving 
rise to a possible democratic deficit for future generations
81
. In this regard, as C. WYPLOSZ puts it, 
“fiscal indiscipline, the tendency to run deficits year in-year out, is the result of a “commons 
                                                     
75 Carlos CLOSA, “The Transformation of Macroeconomic and Fiscal Governance in the EU”, at Serge Champeau; Carlos 
Closa; Daniel Innerarity and Miguel Poiares Maduro (Eds) The Future of Europe Democracy, Legitimacy and Justice 
After the Euro Crisis. Forthcoming (November 2014). 
76 The re-centralization trend in Spain is particularly clear, as the setting up of a centrally managed liquidity fund is in 
practice entailing a centralization via spending power. 
77 This not contested in the literature, although disagreement does remain as to where the growth deterrent figure lies; see 
REINHART, C. M. AND KENNETH S. ROGOFF: “Growth in a Time of Debt”, American Economic Review: Papers 
and Proceedings, 100(2), 2010, pp. 573-578. De Grauwe, P.: “The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone”, Australian 
Economic Review 45(3), 2012, pp. 255 et seq.. See a critic at: PANIZZA, U. AND A. F. PRESBITERO: “Public Debt 
and Economic Growth: Is There a Causal Effect?”, MoFiR working paper No. 65/2012. The actual dangerous rate has not 
been established, and depends on many variables, as the “excelgate” debate came to show in 2013 (see Carmen 
Reinhart/Kenneth Rogoff). 
78 See T. KINDA, C. KOLERUS, P. MUTHOORA, and A. WEBER: “Fiscal Rules at a Glance”, International Monetary 
Fund, October 2013, and the accompanying Fiscal Rules Dataset (1985-2013), all available here:  
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/fiscalrules/matrix/matrix.htm (accessed 12.12.2014). 
79 ELLIOTT, E. D.: “Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit”. Duke Law Journal, n. 6 (december), 1985, pp. 1089-1090. 
80 As the main critics of Keynesianism point out; BUCHANAN, J.; WAGNER, R.: Democracy in Deficit: the Political 
Legacy of Lord Keynes. 1977, pp. 93-154. See online edition http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv8c1.html; 
con paragraphs 8.7.2 et seq. 
81 ELLIOTT, E. D.: “Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit…cit. pp. 1091 a 1092; “future generations are truly subject 
to “taxation without representation”, because today’s politicians can vote to implement programs to benefit today’s voters 
but to be paid for in part by tomorrow’s tax payers”. 
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problem”, the need for democratic governments to spend to cater to pressure groups while avoiding to 
upset taxpayers”82. 
Intergenerational equity is one of the most persuasive arguments to curb deficit and public debt. But 
analysing the normative criteria to establish inequities is complex and not usually part of the debate. 
Roughly put, what indebtedness will finance is a fundamental element of the intergenerational 
analysis
83
. This idea is encapsulated in the so-called golden rule of deficit spending, according to 
which public debt shall only be incurred for investment, but not current spending
84
. The idea is 
relatively simple but harder to execute; typical handbook examples of investment are infrastructures (a 
highway), while an example of current spending would be salaries of public servants. However, in 
practice the golden rule (debt for investment only) is controversial
85
. Among other reasons not to 
enshrine it in a binding rule (constitutional or similar) is that once established there will be accounting 
gimmickry practices in order to conveniently “repackage” current spending as investment86.  
Of course the problem lies in correctly defining investment and current spending, much harder than it 
may seem. Furthermore, exactly which type of expenditures can pass the intergenerational equity test 
and which not will largely depend on political, fungible, decisions is debatable. Building a highway 
may seem like a good investment today as it constitutes an asset that may be enjoyed by future 
generations, so that there is a (future) correlation between that expenditure projected in the future 
(through debt) and its cost. But this will depend on the marginal utility of that asset through its 
lifetime, which can only be roughly estimated.  
Ultimately, the equity test becomes more complicated, because more elements will need to be thrown 
into the formula; such as what public deficit is depending on who generates it (the Government, its 
agency, a strictly regulated public-private corporation...), the time frame taken as a reference point, 
what elements integrate it or the causes for it (structural or not)
87
. The traditional golden rule, which 
limited deficit spending to financing investment, has usually entailed infrastructures (roads, airports). 
However, current spending also may have an intergenerational impact, as will be the case of research 
and education investment, which may facilitate a change in the economic model (as the South Korea 
and Singapore cases show). 
The phenomena grew substantially in the final decades of the last century. In the seventies, and well 
through the nineties, two unrelated phenomena contributed to stressing the importance of establishing 
some type of rules to tip the balance towards controlling the deficit: one, the relative deregulation of 
financial markets, whose consequences on the current financial crisis have been well studied, 
contributed to facilitating emissions of public debt.  
The second phenomenon was a decrease in tax revenues, in particular deriving from income taxes. 
This was the consequences of different elements, among them the sophistication of tax avoidance as 
                                                     
82 WYPLOSZ, C. “Europe’s Quest for Fiscal Discipline”, Economic Papers 498, April 2013, p. 24. 
83 SHAVIRO, D.: Do Deficits Matter? Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 1997, pp. 114 et seq. 
84 ARTIS, M. J.: “The Stability and Growth Pact: Fiscal Policy in the EMU”, at BREUSS, F.; FINK, G.; GRILLER, S. 
(Eds.): Institutional, Legal and Economic Aspects of EMU, Springer, 2003, pp. 111 et seq.; BUTI, M.; FRANCO, D.: 
Fiscal Policy in Economic and Monetary Union. Theory, Evidence and Institutions. Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward 
Elgar, 2005, pp. 6 et seq. 
85 BIRD, R. M.: “Evaluating Public Expenditures: Does it Matter How They are Financed?”, International Tax Program, 
University of Toronto, ITP Paper 0506, pp. 9 y 10: EICHENGREEN, B.: “Institutions for Fiscal Stability, pp. 9 et seq. 
86 KOEN, V.; VAN DEN NOORD, P.: “Fiscal Gimmickry in Europe: One-off measures and creative accounting”. OCDE, 
Economics Department Working Papers, n. 417, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/237714513517, pp. 13 et 
seq. BUTI, M.; FRANCO, D.: Fiscal Policy in Economic and Monetary Union. Theory, Evidence and Institutions…cit. p. 
35. 
87 SHAVIRO, D.: Do Deficits Matter?... pp. 153 et seq. 
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well as globalization, which foster “legal” tax avoidance by making delocalization easier88. As 
controversial as the economic effects of deficits is what contributes more to its creation. As has also 
been pointed out, diminishing tax returns are at least as responsible
89
 as the tendency to increase public 
spending.  
There is a further rationale to introduce specific limits in the analysis of the logic of public spending 
allocations and the democratic process. There are political incentives to spend more across the board
90
. 
Focus is often centred on entitlements; old transfer payments directly or indirectly related to 
entitlements (pension payments, unemployment, public health system, specific transfer payments such 
as child allocation, etc.). But there are also vested interests, lobby groups and the like, that help 
constitute a powerful set of entitlements
91
. An overview of the State Aid Commission decisions gives 
a rough but accurate idea of the types of tax incentives that some corporations receive
92
. 
Enough to enshrine the rules in a Constitution? 
From this perspective, fiscal constraints or budgetary discipline rules may, as a side-effect at least, 
have the virtuous consequence of changing the debate in tax law. Resources are intrinsically scarce, 
but fiscal rules reinforce that view and may at least indirectly help redesign a tax system. Thus 
enshrining fiscal constraints, together with a culture of budgetary discipline, may help end the perverse 
(political) separation between the revenue and the expenditure sides
93
. 
Of course the debate on whether or not and how to enact budgetary constraints rules in the 
Constitution acquires a different character in the EU. The case for controlling debt and the deficit in a 
Monetary Union has been well established; at least to the extent that it may minimize “inflationary 
debt bail-outs”, spill over effects derived from uncoordinated economic and fiscal policies. However, 
this rationale works in two different directions, as at the same time, this may also be a reason not to 
limit beforehand all room for manoeuvre, since the more limited and myopic the rules are, the less 
possible it would be for member states to develop their own cooperation mechanisms
94
, which will 
doom the rules from the beginning. 
There is then a case for introducing such rules in the Constitution. Of course the design of such rules is 
highly debatable. The stress should be put on exactly how much leeway do the rules leave. It has been 
                                                     
88 RUIZ ALMENDRAL, V.: “Tax Avoidance, the ‘Balanced Allocation of Taxing Powers’ and the Arm’s Length Standard: 
an odd threesome in need of clarification”, at Allocating Taxing Powers within the European Union. Series: MPI Studies 
in Tax Law and Public Finance, Vol. 2., at Richelle, Isabelle; Schön, Wolfgang; Traversa, Edoardo (Eds.) Springer; 2013 
edition, (pp. 131-170).   
89 CAMERON, D. R.: “Taxes, Spending and Deficits: Does Government Cause Inflation?”. LINDBERG, L. & MAIER, C. 
(Eds): The Politics of Inflation and Recession. Washington D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1985, pp. 234-239, and pp. 252-
259. See a critic at: WOLFE, D. A.: “Politics, the Deficit and Tax Reform”. Osgoode Hal Law Journal, vol. 26, n. 
2/1988, pp. 351 et seq.  
90 ELLIOTT, E. D.: “Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit…cit. p. 1080, “if one assumes that large structural deficits 
are a problem, they should be understood as symptoms of fundamental diseases in our political institutions that are 
unlikely to be cured short of a constitutional convention”. 
91 See the short piece by James SUROWIECKI “Corporate Welfare Queens”, The New Yorker, October 8th, 2012, describing 
what the author calls the “the corporate welfare state” [http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/10/08/corporate-
welfare-queens, accessed 10.10.2014]. 
92 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/state_aid/  
93 ELLIOTT, E. D.: “Regulating the Deficit after Bowsher v. Synar…cit. p. 352. CAMERON, D. R.: “On the Limits of the 
Public Economy…cit. pp. 50 et seq. 
94 EICHENGREEN, B.; WYPLOSZ, C.: “The Stability Pact: More than a Minor Nuisance…cit. pp. 78 et seq. 
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argued that the more flexible the rules, the greater the probability that they will be respected
95
, but 
experience shows otherwise. Ultimately for the rules to be credible they must first be internalized as 
part of the rationale of public revenue/expending. And they have to be part of the culture, which 
entails, among other things, electorates supporting a debate on what to finance and how. 
Quite evidently, the fact that there are reasons to introduce these rules as constitutionally binding rules 
is not enough. Enshrining debt-deficit control rules in the Constitution is mired with problems in the 
best of scenarios
96
. It is possible to think of many other policy areas that may have spill over effects, 
such as the labour market or the tax system
97
, or climate change. But then again, none of them is 
bound to have a hard impact on the credibility of the currency, which is the ultimate reason for the 
adoption of budgetary constraints. 
Back to basics: taxes vs. debt and the cost of rights 
Recently, in Opinion 49/2015, 5 March, the Spanish Constitutional Court has declared that the 
Government decision not to fully index public pensions was in accordance with Art. 50 of the 
Constitution, which states that “The public authorities shall guarantee, through adequate and 
periodically updated pensions, a sufficient income for citizens in old age”. The Opinion has been 
highly contested and there were four Justices dissenting from it (out of twelve).  
The underlying debate was whether some social rights were irreversible or not, so that even though the 
Constitution enshrined them in ample terms, once old age pensions are indexed to inflation they 
cannot be removed.  
This issue, and the way it has been reasoned (by the dissenting opinion and part of the public) further 
proves that there is no real debate on the opportunity costs of financing some social programmes 
against other social expenditures. Taking into account the looming demographic crisis such 
opportunity cost is only going to grow. 
The fiscal rules legal framework has not been accompanied by a real debate on the cost of rights. 
There has been a very limited and largely biased debate on the cost of bail-outs for creditor countries, 
although this debate has left out the (probably larger) cost of a euro-breakup. 
Any sensible debate on budgetary discipline must departure from a simple public finance handbook 
idea: the fact that all rights cost money and that (especially public) money is scarce. Budgeting is a 
way to structure and monetize opportunity costs. A given country may be able to finance public 
universities but most likely not all of them, if so, then less money will need to be allocated, for 
instance, for early years education
98
. 
                                                     
95 SCHELKLE, W.: “EU Fiscal Governance: Hard Law in the Shadow of Soft Law?”. Columbia Journal of European Law, 
vol. 13/2007, pp. 707 et seq. 
96 As the USA case shows; see ELLIOTT, E. D.: “Regulating the Deficit after Bowsher v. Synar…cit. pp. 349 et seq, on the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, struck down by Bwosher v. Synar. 
97 CLOSA, Carlos, “The Transformation of Macroeconomic and Fiscal Governance in the EU”, at Serge Champeau; Carlos 
Closa; Daniel Innerarity and Miguel Poiares Maduro (Eds) The Future of Europe Democracy, Legitimacy and Justice 
After the Euro Crisis. Forthcoming (November 2014). 
98 One current debate in Spain is the cost of higher education. This debate can be had in theory –should we finance public 
education? Or, more usefully, in practice: should we finance every law student on the country? Spain has 56 Law 
schools, so a sophisticated cost debate should start by questioning whether it makes sense to have a law school in 
virtually every province (the author, born in 1975, is well aware that sophisticated debate will have her generation of law 
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All rights have costs, if only because all of them must be enforced at one time or another and this will 
need, at least, establishing a publicly financed court system
99
. From this perspective, third generation 
rights (such as health, education, pension funds) are no costlier than fundamental rights (due process, 
the right to property, freedom of speech)
100
. The cost of rights debate must be the centre of any public 
debate on fiscal restrictions. There is a spending ceiling, but there is also a revenue floor, which is 
harder to fulfil in light of declining tax revenues (a fiscal crisis of the welfare state, as James 
O’Connor put it)101. It naturally follows that enshrining rights in a Constitution already determines 
how the budget should be spent.  
And scarcity is not a contingency but the essential element of the public purse. No right can be 
absolutely guaranteed as no right can be fully financed. Spending should be analysed on a regular 
basis. This can be done by means of budgeting techniques (such as “zero budgeting”). In the mid-term 
at least the current social model of the European Union will need to be evaluated. The shortest (and 
also the most unfair) way is across the board cuts to social programmes, given the obvious fact that an 
ageing population together with soaring health costs make meeting the current demands of the system 
next to impossible. On the other hand, substantial revision of the current spending programmes (which 
roughly represent 50 per cent of EU member states budgets) should be revised following an evidence-
based approach
102
. 
Evaluating the cost of rights is often welcomed with a great amount of suspicion, as it is usually 
identified with restricting such rights. Quite surprisingly, no Constitutional Law handbook mentions 
this issue (to the best of my knowledge). This is part of the reason why a debate on the cost remains 
partly hidden even though there are daily, tangible examples that show how some things are financed 
and others are not. Budgetary cuts receive wildly different public responses depending on the sector 
that is affected by them. The budgetary cuts of civil servants pay in Spain have resulted in more than 
fifty cases pending before the Court, either by Courts or Autonomous Communities challenging the 
pay cuts. The substantial budgetary cuts that have ended of reduced school-lunch programmes, also 
decided by laws (budgetary laws) have not been challenged and have had a much smaller impact in the 
media
103
. Civil servants are an organized group. Impoverished (or rather their parents) children are 
not
104
.  
On the other hand, and despite common political (and academic) discourse, there is in practice no such 
thing as red lines that cannot be trespassed in the guarantee of rights. There are many examples to 
                                                     
99 Constitutional lawyers and scholars have an intriguing tendency to ignore this, beautifully explained, with US examples, by 
S. HOLMES and C. S. SUSTEIN, The Cost of Rights. Why Liberty Depends on Taxes. W. W. Norton & Company, 1999; 
see in particular pp. 87 et seq. 
100 All rights are positive; see on this S. HOLMES and C. S. SUSTEIN, The Cost of Rights. Why Liberty Depends on Taxes. 
W. W. Norton & Company, 1999, pp. 37 et seq., on the futility of the dichotomy between positive and negative rights. 
101 Eurostat (Tax trends in the EU).  
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illustrate this point. Take the above mentioned article 50
105
 of the Spanish Constitution (a “positive” 
right), which guarantees that retirement pensions must be adequate and periodically updated so that 
they do not lose spending potential. The current President (Mr. Rajoy), as well as the former (Mr. 
Zapatero) have at one time or another publicly stated that indexing pensions to inflation is a red line 
that cannot be trespassed. It has, of course, already been trespassed (and challenged before the 
Constitutional Court) but the relevant discussion is exactly against what other public expenditures this 
guarantee should be maintained, in view of the rapidly ageing population and the unbearably high 
unemployment rate in Spain. A harder to see but just as obvious example is the protection of 
fundamental rights. With a judicial system that sometimes takes 10 years to answer citizens claims it is 
hard to argue that the right to a due process is sufficiently guaranteed in practice. 
In a limited patched-up way, there is of course a Europe wide debate on the cost of Euro-crisis law, 
but it has mainly focused on what bail-outs actually cost (although with little debate of the cost of not 
financing bail-outs). Of course the financing of the assistance mechanisms represent a substantial 
percentage of the Member States budgets cannot be ignored
106
. 
Specifically, the current European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has a potential maximum lending 
capability of €700 billion, distributed among Member States in relation to their GDP. Of that amount, 
only 80 billion must be paid in directly, while the remaining 620 operates as a guarantee
107
. The 
Capital subscriptions (callable capital) represent a substantial percentage of their national budget. 
Much less is of course the size of the paid-in capital.  
The participation in the ESM depends on the size of GDP
108
. Thus, for the top financing Member 
State, Germany (27.1464%), this will represent €22bn of paid-in capital and €168bn of callable capital 
(in total, €190 billion). Taking into account, for the sake of comparison, the 2012109 budget, it would 
represent 16 per cent (190,024 /1,191,490 x 100). For Spain, the ESM total callable capital represents 
roughly 16.9 per cent of the annual budget (83,325/491,414 x 100). For France, about 12.39 per cent 
(142,701/1,151,257 x 100); for Italy, 15.82 per cent (125,395/792,583 x 100); finally, for Finland, it 
would represent about 11.54 per cent (total expenditure in 2012: 12,581/108,927 x 100). So far, only 
Finland and Germany have raised the concern of the cost, discussion whether approval of a sum of 
money that may jeopardize the sustainability of the Parliament
110
. 
Any obligation to spend implies a restriction of the budget. The conundrum is expressed very well by 
the German constitutional Court’s Opinion of 18 March 2014 [BVerfG, 2 BvR 1390/12]111, (par. 169): 
“a constitutional commitment on the part of the Parliaments and thus a palpable restriction of their 
budgetary power to act may be necessary precisely in order to preserve the democratic power to shape 
affairs in the long term (cf. BVerfG 129, 124 <170>). Even if such a commitment restricts democratic 
                                                     
105 Official translation source: 
Section 50, The public authorities shall guarantee, through adequate and periodically updated pensions, a sufficient income 
for citizens in old age. Likewise, and without prejudice to the obligations of the families, they shall promote their welfare 
through a system of social services that provides for their specific problems of health, housing, culture and leisure” 
106 As K. TUORI AND P. CRAIG have, among others, pointed out in the papers I quote in this. 
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billion. 
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109 All data derived from Eurostat, Government Finance statistics, Summary tables — 2/2013. 
110 Finland Constitutional Committee report PeVL 13/2012; and BverfG, 2 BvR 1390/12, 12 September 2012. 
111 See English version: 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20140318_2bvr139012en.html (accessed 19.3.2014) 
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legislative discretion in the present, it guarantees it for the future. Admittedly, even a worrisome long-
term development of the level of debt is not a constitutionally relevant impairment of the legislature’s 
power to decide on fiscal policy at its discretion, and dependent on the situation. Nevertheless, this 
results in a de facto constriction of discretion (cf. BVerfG 119, 96 <147>). To avoid such a 
constriction is a legitimate aim of the (constitutional) legislature (BVerfG 132, 195 <245>, n. 120)”.  
But the debate has only focused on the cost of bail-outs, which is high, but more limited and time 
constraints than the makeup of public spending.  
Clearly, the figures show that Member States have enough skin in the game to worry about moral 
hazard issues. However, the response to the ESM has been asymmetrical, with Germany (by far the 
main contributor) but also Finland contesting it on constitutional grounds, while in other countries 
there has not been much debate. The explanation for this cannot be oversimplified as it depends on the 
current culture of budgetary control as a whole. In Spain, despite the substantial percentage that the 
contribution represents, it has not received much public attention, and it has certainly not raised any 
constitutional concerns. In my opinion, this is explained not by a higher sense of solidarity but because 
Spain’s culture of budgetary control is relatively new, and it does not yet actually have and public 
debates on the cost of government programs or otherwise social expenditure are not a substantial part 
of public debate as a whole.  
The fundamental (pending) question is whether the budgetary discipline legal framework is a gate 
towards greater integration in substance, the actual distribution of public spending within the Union. 
The answer now is no. The four building blocks of the blueprint for further EMU integration named in 
the December 2012 report are: financial integration, integrated budgetary framework, an integrated 
economic policy framework and democratic legitimacy and accountability of decision-making within 
the European Monetary Union
112
. What to spend the money on is of course not mentioned in this 
document, which also only en passant refers to where the money should come from (taxation) and 
how. The report does, however, point in the direction of a deeper economic and political integration. 
The current debate on greater integration makes more salient the fact that there still is a crucial 
missing element: what to finance (the cost of rights debate) and how to finance it (the design of the tax 
system). Taxation is only mentioned en passant
113
 (p. 5) and, more worryingly, there seems to be an 
intention to leave Member States’ systems untouched; thus, in page 11, when discussing the options 
for the development of the EU’s fiscal capacity, it is argued that “it will be important to ensure that, 
irrespective of the approach that is followed, establishing this function does not affect the overall level 
of public expenditure and tax pressure in the euro area”114. 
Provisional conclusions 
There is, in my opinion, a case for constitutionalizing such rules in an imperfect monetary union, but it 
should be done as a result of a Convention and with careful wording so as to not restrict the necessary 
leeway for Member States. Of course enshrining constitutional rules limiting the debt and deficit 
implies a petrification of political options (Carlos Closa), but so does enshrining fundamental rights, 
which can then evolve as all constitutional options do (the Constitution as a living tree).  In fact, the 
case for fiscal constraints and its introduction in the Constitution is not so different from the case for 
                                                     
112 President Van Rompuy together with J. M. Barroso, J-C Juncker and M. Draghi: “Towards a Genuine European Monetary 
Union”, December 2012. 
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establishing the building blocks of a revenue system. In fact Western constitutions have a preference 
for a revenue system based on taxes. 
An entirely different matter is just what the specific wording of the constitutional clause should be. It 
can be argued the way the legal framework has adopted, and adapted, the existing economic wisdom is 
suboptimal but is the result of a sketchy unorganized process, where general principles have 
transformed into one size fits all strict rules, whose sanctions are neither clear nor credible.  
The design of the fiscal rules should avoid reductions in spending without sufficient assessment. 
Senseless austerity with across the board cuts may be just as harmful for long term growth as fiscal 
profligacy. When specific rules are established, deficit and debt will be reduced at all costs to avoid 
breaching them. Some of the measures will or may entail reducing investment
115
. Therefore, a 
provision such as fiscal discipline that intends to force policy makers to think long-term is complied 
with by adopting short-term measures that endanger long-term sustainability (across the board 
budgetary cuts in science and technology in Spain are a good example). To the extent that deficit and 
debt thresholds matter more than the route taken to achieve them, there is a powerful incentive to 
introduce austerity measures, which then crowd out real reform measures. Budget cuts across the 
board do have immediate effects on the budget and are politically very useful when working on ever 
shorter election terms. However, it is real reforms that have the only possibility to be game changing 
(measures to tackle an ageing population: drastic immigration reform, pension and health system 
reforms; to curb diminishing of tax reforms: such as an EU BEPS initiative to curb tax evasion). 
The existing legal framework has not brought about a substantial change in the EU Economic 
constitution. It has also not substantially diminished, if anything the opposite, the powers of 
Parliaments with regard to the budget. 
There have been, however, fundamental missed opportunities. One is to design a credible monetary 
system that permits decoupling the currency with the fiscal situation of member states. Excess deficit 
and debt does not pre-determine default. Markets will reward any definition of sustainability. By 
focusing on big numbers the message sent is that those should be rewarded. Markets are not 
sophisticated, but they are based on confidence and confidence alone, which helps explain why a 
country with such large public debt as the USA does not have sustainability issues (measured as the 
cost of bond yields): the market believes on the capacity of paying that debt. Precisely the problem 
with the current debt levels in the EU is not their levels per se, but the possibility of a long stagnation 
period. 
There are other causes for concern in the current design. For example, what the role of constitutional 
courts should be. As rules become part of constitutional systems, Courts will need to make sense of 
them and ultimately declare, when necessary, that a given provision has breached the rule. The theory 
is, again, easy to understand, create a rule, enforce it and control its application. In practice, it will be 
very difficult to narrow exactly what legal provision constitutes a breach of the rule.  
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